Motivation
Divergence of social and private interests is a standard feature of many economic situations. Market failures may be minimized or avoided by an appropriate choice of a tax or subsidy schedule that induces the individual to internalize the external costs and benefits of his action. Consider, for instance, the external costs generated as a car travels at different speeds on an expressway. Suppose that as the car drives at a speed x it imposes a net social externality ( ) s x . The external effect includes the danger to other drivers in the event of an accident as well as the possibility of an accident itself, both of which vary with speed. If the driver has a net benefit ( ) B x from driving at a speed x then he can be induced to drive at the socially optimal speed that maximizes B(x)-s(x) by a penalty or Pigouvian tax p(x), which, if speed is observed, satisfies p(x)=s(x) regardless of the specific functional form of ( ) B x .
The tax achieves its purpose when the speed x of the car is perfectly measured. If, however, the technology allows only an imperfect measurement of the speed of the car then the driver of the car will not generally choose the socially optimal speed. As an example, suppose s(x) is convex, and Y is the unbiased but imperfect measure of speed. Then [ ( ) | ] ( ) E s Y x s x  . Thus, a penalty function p(y)=s(y) based on the observed speed y will usually result in a choice of speed which is different from the socially optimal speed.
The natural question then is whether a penalty function based on the imperfectly observed speed y can force the agent to internalize the cost s(x) for driving at speed x regardless of his benefit function. We consider the following problem: Suppose a tax or subsidy function s(x) associated with an action level x that is measured perfectly achieves a certain objective. 1 For ease of reference, let us call s(x) a (social) externality function. The action x is only imperfectly observed as a random variable Y whose distribution depends on the true action x.
1 The function ( ) ( ) p x s x  could be a Pigouvian tax, or alternately, ( ) s x could be viewed as a price/penalty function that can help the market to co-ordinate towards the optimum described by Coase (1960) . Generally, we will treat ) (x s to be a given target tax or transfer function.
We examine how and when a tax or subsidy function p(y) of the observed signal gives rise to the same choice of action by the agent as the tax or subsidy function s(x) regardless of the nature of his benefit function. In this case, there is a Pigouvian solution to the problem of externalities even when the behavior is observed with error. 1 We will show that in a broad class of circumstances, there is indeed a solution to the problem for risk neutral agents. What is needed is that there is enough information in the signal to separate distributions of behaviors. If two distinct distributions over behaviors produce the identical distribution of signals, then it is not possible to distinguish these distributions with a penalty function.
If the function s separates the distributions, then no solution can possibly exist, because the signal does not distinguish distributions that the penalty function separates. Therefore separating distributions is necessary. The remarkable fact is that it is also sufficient. Moreover, the same condition conveniently works for both finite and continuous state spaces.
Interest in the implementability of desired outcomes by penalty functions is not new. Pigou (1952) suggested that forcing an agent to internalize the damage he causes by taxing him the amount of the damage would take the market toward efficiency. Coase (1960) critiqued that the Pigouvian scheme for providing the wrong incentives. However, interpreted appropriately (so that the price suggested by Coase is the tax) the Pigouvian principle continues to hold in his examples. In fact, Sandmo (1975) showed that in the absence of government revenue requirements the Pigouvian tax implements the first best, and when there is a revenue requirement the Pigouvian principle extends appropriately. In all these cases, of course, the agent's action is perfectly observable and there is no uncertainty about any element of the model. Kwerel (1977) , Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1980) , Duggan and Roberts (2002) , among others, assume that there are a finite number of polluting 1 Note that the role of y is purely that of a signal on the true action x that actually gives rise to the externality. If the observable y completely determines the level of externality then we are back in the perfect observability case.
firms with costs not observable to the regulator. They show that the first best outcome (that arises when costs are perfectly observable) is implementable in equilibrium. In these models, the emission level by each firm is perfectly observable. In reality, the total pollution is often not observable. While the rate at which a car pollutes can be observed through some tests, the amount of gasoline burnt or the number of city miles are not easy to observe. Montero (2005) assumes that the emission level is not observable but the emission rate is. The first best outcome cannot be implemented in this framework. In contrast, we consider a situation where the agent cannot perfectly control what the principal observes, that is, his action gives rise to a stochastic signal.
The principal-agent formulation of our problem demands a few words about its relationship with the agency literature. What we consider here is different from the standard agency problems in that we introduce externality to the standard problem and require that a single penalty function implement the target externality function for all relevant action levels. As a result, even if the principal and the agent are risk-neutral a non-linear externality function makes it a different type of problem. The difference in the nature of the problems is most easily seen by observing that in the moral hazard model (cf. Holmstrom, 1979) , the first best is always implementable when the agent is risk neutral which is not true in our setting. 2 Thus, our results sit nicely between the standard agency models and the literature on implementation of tax functions.
Most mechanism design solutions entail complicated mechanisms that are very sensitive to the underlying description of the environment. This sensitivity is especially extreme when correlation is exploited to mitigate incentive constraints. In contrast to most related literature, we provide an approximation to the solution that has quite modest informational requirements (means and variances of the error function), which in many applications are knowable.
Consequently, our approach is plausibly applicable in real world settings, such as the speeding example discussed above. 
The Model
3 In what follows we do not need to directly use  in the analysis. The notation is to highlight the fact that agents are assumed to have private information on how their utilities depend on the action. The notation also allows convenient exposition if one extends our analysis to other market structures or to the agency problems.
Quasi-linearity of utility implies that p(y) implements s(x) if
is first-best in spite of imperfect observability of action.
In the finite actions case we assume x takes values 1, 2,..., n so that ( | ) f i j is the probability that action i is observed when action j is undertaken. In this case where the agent is risk-neutral we have that
x The reason for considering both cases is that a finite dimensional approach with finite matrices makes the analysis straightforward. However, the intuition from the finite dimensional case often does not extend to the infinite dimensional analysis where a continuous set of actions is undertaken. Also, the standard literature on both externality and the basic agency problems primarily deal with the continuous models. Thus, it is necessary to treat the continuous actions case separately. While the infinite dimensional analysis does not permit the ease of working with matrices, we are able to verify some of the key findings from the finite actions case.
Some Notation. Throughout this paper we will denote by  the uniform probability measure on the interval
We denote by A the expectation
In the finite action case, A will denote the n m  matrix which is a standard linear transformation from n R to m R . When the actions are continuous it is the integral operator (a continuous
In light of the fact that we work with a 2 ( ) L  space, the equalities and other similar relationships must be interpreted as almost everywhere  .
Can the Crime Fit the Punishment?
When does using the social externality function as a penalty work even in the presence of error? Our first result shows that in the infinite dimensional space of all possible externality functions only a "negligible" sub-collection of externality
Proposition 1. Consider the continuous action case. In any given environment there are at most a finite number of linearly independent penalty functions that can be implemented straightforwardly by ( ) ( ) p y s y  . In other words, given
functions that can be implemented straightforwardly belong to a finite dimensional space.
Proof. See Appendix.
Of course, if there is no error, the penalty function s p  implements the externality function s. However, not only is zero error sufficient, it is also necessary for all s to implement itself. Proof. See Appendix.
We now turn to positive results.
Existence
We now examine environments where an externality function can be implemented by some penalty function. The problem is best understood when X and Y are finite. In this case s is implemented by p if Ap=s where p and s are nand m-vectors, respectively. Existence of a solution p is at the center of problems ranging from extraction of information rent in auctions to implementation of payment functions in agency problems and existence of continuation payoffs in repeated games. The conditions that are generally used to obtain existence for this class of problems are variations of the spanning condition which requires that the matrix A have full row rank. However, the spanning condition is not necessary for implementation.
The necessary and sufficient condition for a solution to Ap=s to exist is in fact that the system of equations be consistent. To formalize this idea with an intuitive interpretation in mind, and to generalize to the infinite dimensional framework we need the following definitions:
When X is finite the integrals are substituted by summations.
We can now state the finite dimensional version of the necessary and sufficient condition using the separation terminology. 
Proposition 3 (Existence -finite actions
Existence of a sequence of penalty functions that have the above convergence property need not guarantee that the corresponding sequence of choices made by the agent will also converge to the agent's choice under s(x). The choice depends on the transfer function as well as the benefit function B (x,θ) . If the sequence of action choices does not converge to the action choice under s(x) then an approximate implementation in the above sense is obviously meaningless.
Therefore, we assume that the functions B(x,θ) and s(x) are such that whenever a sequence s n (x) converges to s(x) then the action-choices under s n (x) also converge to the action-choice under s(x). Whenever the underlying optimization problem faced by the agent satisfies this condition we say that the problem is regular.
We can now state the infinite dimensional version of our result: 
Related results and conditions in the literature
The problem of implementing a target expected payment function arises in Cremer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) under a spanning-type condition on transition probabilities. The main distinction is that both papers utilitize a menu of contracts, and hence can use selection by the agent as an indication of the agent's type. In contrast, we do not anticipate using a menu for the externalities problem because that requires contracting in advance.
Contracting in advance is, of course, implausible in the case of speeding and absurd in the case of intoxicated drivers.
Models of pure moral hazard (cf. Holmstrom, 1979) are closer to our model in spirit. However, these models typically aim to induce the appropriate behavior at a single point; in our notation, it would be as if the function B were
given and identical for all types of agents. The need to implement a function at multiple points arises when the agent has multiple types. Laffont and Tirole (1986), McAfee and McMillan (1987) , among others consider such models of moral hazard with private types and quasi-linear utilities. As in the rent extraction problem, the agency problems approach the solution with menu of contracts.
In certain environments menu of contract (that is type-dependent contracts) are not necessary. Melumad and Reichelstein (1989) show that under a spanning condition (i.e., full row-rank type for finite matrices) mentioned earlier on the transition probabilities f(y|x), the type-independent transfer p(θ,y) is as good as the type-independent transfer p(y). That the condition is not necessary is clearly demonstrated in their paper. condition that, when used with implementability, is also a type of full row rank condition. 9 Thus, these conditions also require that the signal space be sufficiently rich. For instance, the individual full rank condition requires that the number of signals be at least as many as the number of actions. Of course, they work with finite sets so they do not have to consider the infinite dimensional version of the conditions.
Construction of a Penalty Function
Existence theorems are often cold comfort to someone who needs to use a construct. In this section we provide a method of constructing the penalty function in the case of multiplicative errors.
Suppose that Y x  , 0   and that the externality function s is analytic, so that it can be expressed by a Taylor series:
whenever the series converges absolutely at each point in the support (so that the expectation can be taken inside the summation). This is a full solution for 8 One of the rows of the matrix of conditional probabilities drops out due to linear dependence, leaving the rest of the rows linearly independent. 9 The implementability condition may cause some of the incentive constraints that must be solved in their problem hold with strict inequality, and thus drop out of the system of equations whose solutions they look for. In that case, what we are left with is a system of linearly independent equations.
analytic s for the multiplicative case. In addition, for any continuous s on a compact set of x , we can approximate arbitrarily closely by first approximating s with an analytic function and then using the p for the analytic function.
How does the penalty compare to the externality? Suppose that Y=xε, for ε≥0, and the error is either unbiased or upward biased, i.e. Because s(log()) is analytic, we can express Under the hypothesis that errors are small, we can provide a sharper characterization of the penalty functions. Imagine that a car going at 100 mph generates an externality s , would the corresponding penalty function charge more than s or less upon observing a speed of 100 mph? A 10 mph increase in speed at 100 mph could presumably do much more damage than the same increase would do at 70 mph. Would the corresponding penalty function reflect that?
When the error is sufficiently "local" in nature, the Taylor expansion allows close approximation of the penalty function given the externality function.
Moreover, the higher order terms can be ignored for broad classes of situations and the penalty function compared with the externality function based on its lower order derivatives. Small errors are reasonable in many settings where large errors would prohibit legal remedies.
In what follows we let Y be the observation by the regulator and provide a formula for approximating the penalty function that implements an externality function ( ) s x when the associated observational error is small. Let
Proposition 5. Suppose that the family of random variables
is twice differentiable and monotonic. 10 If the  2 (x) is small, the penalty function is approximated by 11
In particular, when the signal distribution is unbiased, we have
The two assumptions are necessary to apply the Taylor approximation result at ( ) x  , i.e. to apply the approximation on a function at the point it is necessary for the function to exist in a small neighborhood. The assumptions guarantee precisely that. 11 Obviously, the smaller the error the better the approximation.
It is now much easier to relate the penalty to the externality function. For instance, when the observation is unbiased (
small, the penalty function is smaller or larger than the externality function depending on whether s is convex or concave.
Conclusion
Given a penalty function which implements a social objective, this paper examines the possibility of implementing the social objective when the action is observed with error. Provided that the signal is informative in the sense that it separates distributions of actions and agents are risk-neutral, the social objective remains implementable even with observational error. In addition, when errors are small, there is a closed form second-order approximation for the penalty function that depends only on first and second moments and two derivatives of the externality function. The formula is applicable when activity is measured reasonably accurately, which is necessary for a fair implementation. This formula is simple enough to lend itself to actual implementation.
In our formulation of the problem we have kept the model as context-free as possible insofar as the market structure is concerned. The principal-agent framework in which we posed our problem immediately fits the case of an externality producing monopoly firm. The analysis holds for other market structures, as well, even if with some modification.
The analysis does not apply in the form of first-best implementation when the agent is risk averse. The difficulty arises due to the welfare effect of the redistributive role of tax function when the agent is risk averse. If the agent is risk averse and the penalty is a function of a stochastic signal, the socially optimal penalty function depends on the conditional distribution of the signal.
Implementing a function that is first-best when the action is observed perfectly may not be optimal in the stochastic environment due to the risk cost to the society. 12 Implementation of a target function s(x) in itself may, however, be possible. For instance, when the agent has constant absolute risk aversion utility of the form
Steps similar to those under risk neutrality show that the penalty function of y that forces the agent to behave the same as the externality function s(x) is approximated by
generally not optimal any more.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that the integral operator A is compact.
Therefore, if there is a non-zero function ( ) s x such that As s  then the operator has an eigenvalue 1. The result then follows upon applying Proposition II.4.13 of Conway (1990) 
